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I.  Authors and editors of the laws: On the normative point of rights-based 
judicial review
Constitutional or other rights adjudicating courts do not only resolve concrete 
disputes on the basis of narrowly drafted specific rules. Human or constitutional 
rights, to the extent they play a significant role in constitutional adjudication, are 
mostly relatively abstract principles, whose application requires the assessment 
of actions of public authority by reference to the proportionality test. In such a 
context courts and legislatures are effectively partners in the process of speci-
fying and giving concrete meaning to abstract rights provisions. I have argued 
elsewhere (kumm, 2010) that in this partnership each institution has a distinctive 
role to play. The legislative process is justice focused: It is a process in which 
electorally accountable institutions enact laws to settle disagreement about what 
justice requires through deliberations and negotiations. The legislative process 
structures the authorial role that citizens play. The judicial process is legitimacy 
focused and engages the editorial role of citizens (pettit, 1999). It is a process 
in which norm-addressees can contest outcomes of the political process before 
judicial institutions claiming that their rights have been violated, requiring public 
authorities to show that the settlement reached is demonstrably susceptible to 
a reasonable justification. If an impartial and independent court determines that 
such justification is not possible, then that decision violates the rights of the 
burdened persons, lacks legitimate authority and should not be applied as law. 
In the editorial role citizens seek to ensure through the constitutional judiciary 
that the authority exercised in their name by the legislature is in fact exercised 
legitimately: Burdens imposed by the laws must be demonstrably justifiable to 
those burdened as a reasonable attempt to do justice also to them. If such a 
justification succeeds, the addressee can´t reasonably reject law´s claim to le-
gitimate authority. Courts, under this conception, play an independent role as 
jurisgenerative junior partners to political branches of government. Under such 
a conception of contestatory democratic constitutionalism the right to vote and 
the right to contest are equally non-negotiable participatory features of the con-
stitutionalist enterprise. Citizens are not just authors of the laws collectively; they 
are also editors of the laws individually.
A normatively attractive institutionalization of the relationship between con-
stitutional courts and legislatures must meet three adequacy conditions. First the 
legislature must retain overall effective control not only over the legislative agen-
da, but also over outcomes. This is necessary to ensure a sufficiently close link 
between elections and the authorial function of legislation. Once judicial power 
becomes so strong that overall legislative effective control is lost, the step from 
contestatory democracy to juristocracy has been taken. Second, the judiciary 
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must be sufficiently impartial and independent from electorally accountable insti-
tutions and be able to provide an effective remedy against legislative encroach-
ments of rights. Meaningful contestation is more than an advisory or consulting 
role that the other side, whose decisions are being contested, is in principle 
free to ignore. Once legislative power is not constrained by courts as an effec-
tive contestatory institution, the step from constitutional democracy to electoral 
authoritarianism has been taken. Third, the interaction between the legislature 
and judiciary must be structured in such a way, that meaningful discursive en-
gagement is fostered. Rather than just a balance of power that organizes legally 
structured institutional competition and standoffs, the idea of a deliberatively 
guided partnership should inform institutionalization.
The following section (II) seeks to analyse three centrally relevant institutional 
variables and the range of their concrete specification for the design of institu-
tional structures that are responsive to the first two normative concerns. A third 
section (III) will then connect the adequacy conditions for judicial review to the 
choices relating to these variables in two concrete contexts: rights-adjudicating 
courts in the US and the UK. I will argue that both are institutionalized in ways 
that are problematic, for opposing reasons: In the US the institutional position 
of the Supreme Court is too strong in its relationship the legislature, effectively 
enabling juristocracy. In the UK the position of the courts is too weak, effectively 
enabling electoral authoritarianism. What this suggests is that the somewhat 
tired debate about judicial review in an important sense misses the point. Even if 
judicial review can be justified in principle, the real issue is how it is institutional-
ized and, more specifically, how the relationship between judicial and legislative 
institutions is structured.
II.  On the relationship between the judiciary and the legislative branches: 
Three institutional variables
1. Rules governing legislative displacement of judicial interpretations
As a starting point, let us assume that a court has concluded that a statute 
enacted by the legislature violates a human or constitutional right. Let us further 
assume that the legislature remains unconvinced. In its view the court has not 
properly assessed the reasons justifiying an infringement of the right and there-
fore came to the wrong conclusion. Even after the judicial decision, the rights 
reviewing court and the original rights-assessing legislature continue to disagree. 
One key variable defining the relationship between courts and legislatures con-
cerns the conditions under which legislatures can displace the judicial interpreta-
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tion and establish their own view of what the law should be as valid law. The fact 
that a court has the power to determine whether or not a piece of legislation vio-
lates a right, does not yet say very much about what the constitutional status of 
such a determination is. More specifically, if the legislature remains unconvinced 
by the courts’ interpretation of rights and seeks to insist on its understanding 
of the limits of rights in light of countervailing concerns, what are the conditions 
under which the legislature´s views can be made to legally prevail even against 
a judicial judgment? Here there are considerable differences across liberal con-
stitutional democracies. 
In what Stephen Gardbaum has called the “Commonwealth Model” (gard-
Baum, 2013), ordinary legislative majorities effectively continue to control what is 
to count as law in a jurisdiction, notwithstanding judicial involvement. Within the 
Commonwealth Model there are nevertheless significant variations. 
In the United Kingdom under the 1998 Human Rights Act1 the judgment 
made by the court is declaratory only. That means the court does not have the 
authority to invalidate the laws it has reviewed and deemed to be rights-violative, 
but merely makes a declaration determining that the law violates a human right. 
As a consequence of such a judicial holding the issue is reverted back to the 
legislature, which then has the opportunity to reassess the issue and amend the 
law in a fast track legislative procedure. If the legislature remains unconvinced 
by the judicial determination and holds that there is no cause for it to act, then 
legally the original legislative decision remains valid. The legislature prevails, even 
if it remains passive and does nothing. Only if it cooperates with the court and 
decides to amend or abolish the law held to be incompatible with human rights 
by the court does the law stop being valid law. 
Canada also subscribes to what Gardbaum calls “the Commonwealth Mod-
el”. But even though like in the UK legislative majorities also remain in control, the 
position of courts is somewhat stronger. The court effectively has the authority 
to declare invalid a piece of legislation2. To override the judicial decision a legisla-
tive majority must act: It must affirmatively declare that the act or provision shall 
operate notwithstanding a judicial holding that it violates certain constitutional 
rights3.
In most jurisdictions judicial review is “stronger” than in the “Commonwealth 
Model”. Normally ordinary legislative majorities cannot effectively overturn a judi-
cial decision and therefore do not control outcomes. Interestingly there appears 
1  Section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
2  This follows from section 52 (the supremacy clause) and section 24 (the enforcement clause) of the 
Constitution Act of 1982.
3  See section 33 of the Constitution Act of 1982. Under section 33(3) and (4) such a declaration has 
effect for a period of five years but may be re-enacted indefinetly. 
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to be no constitutional jurisdiction that specifically authorizes the legislature to 
overrule the court´s interpretation of a right by way of a qualified majority deci-
sion. Instead, what many constitutions would effectively require for a legislature 
to override a judicial decision is to amend the constitution. What that requires 
depends on the provisions governing constitutional amendments. These pro-
visions vary considerably across jurisdictions. Generally the amendment of a 
constitutional text requires qualified majorities, often 2/3 majorities in the main 
legislative body or bodies. In some federal constitutions, like the US or Canada, 
it is additionally required that a majority or a qualified majority of states also vote 
in favor of such an amendment.
Furthermore there are jurisdictions where courts will enforce limits to the 
power to amend the constitution. Often basic principles – mostly core basic 
rights or basic commitments to democracy, the rule of law or aspects of the 
federal structure – may not be abolished by way of constitutional amendment. 
The grounds for these limitations are either explicit constitutional norms limit-
ing the amendment power4 or jurisprudential arguments immunizing the basic 
structure of the constitution from the reach of the ordinary amendment power5. 
When a constitutional court insists that a certain understanding of a right is part 
of the entrenched constitutional guarantees that cannot be amended, this pre-
cludes the legislature from using the ordinary constitutional amendment power 
to overrule the court´s decision. Some constitutions, such as those of Spain6 or 
Austria7 have specifically qualified amendment procedures, requiring referenda 
or requiring sequential 2/3 majorities, with an intervening election8 to overcome 
such limits of the ordinary amendment power. But other constitutions say noth-
ing about how such limits can be overcome. In such jurisdictions the issue arises 
4  See Art. 79 Sect. 3 German Basic Law.
5  In India the ‘Doctrine of Basic Structure’ is a judge-made doctrine which was propounded by the 
Indian Judiciary on 24th April 1973 in the Keshavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru case. It stated that the 
constitutional amending powers of the Parliament was limited so that the ‘basic structure of the basic law 
of the land’ cannot be amended in exercise of its ‘constituent power’ under the Constitution. 
6  Title X of the Spanish Constitution establishes that the approval of a new constitution or the approval 
of any constitutional amendment affecting the Preliminary Title, or Section I of Chapter II of Title I (on 
Fundamental Rights and Public Liberties) or Title II (on the Crown), the so-called “protected provisions”, 
are subject to a special process that requires (1) that two-thirds of each House approve the amendment, 
(2) that elections are called immediately thereafter, (3) that two-thirds of each new House approves the 
amendment, and (4) that the amendment is approved by the people in a referendum.
7  See Art. 44 of the Austrian Constitution.
8  It is often said that an act of the constituent power could dislodge any entrenched commitment 
of principle. But that view presupposes that the constituent power of the people is not itself internally 
circumscribed by a set of basic principles. If the idea of constituent power is conceived as a the power 
to give concrete institutional and legal shape to the idea of self-government of free and equals, then 
constitutional provisions that are incompatible with that idea can´t be validated by reference to constituent 
power (kumm, 2016). 
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whether an act of the constituent power – however it may operate procedurally 
in a given context – can legally change the court´s interpretation or whether even 
the constituent power is a power is internally limited by certain basic principles 
that preclude overturning a specific judicial decision. 
2.  Appointment, tenure and Impeachment (good behavior) rules: Rules 
ensuring general alignment of judges with majoritarian sensibilities, 
while ensuring impartiality and independance:
But decisions by courts can be overcome not only through re-endorsement 
of statutes by the legislature or acts of constitutional amendment. The court 
can also overrule its own judgments. One way the legislature might respond 
to a decision it remains unpersuaded by is to seek to persuade the court to 
change its mind. In principle all it takes to try this is to reenact a statute like the 
one declared unconstitutional and have the issue re-litigated. But in practice the 
probability of success of such an endeavor is low, since it is highly unlikely that 
the same court consisting of the same judges and adjudicating the same issues 
will reverse itself. The situation becomes more promising from the legislature´s 
point of view, however, if political actors have in the meantime had the possibility 
to appoint new judges more aligned with their general political orientations. So 
the question becomes how the link between the appointment of judges and 
politically accountable institutions is structured. 
On the one hand judges are rarely themselves directly elected9. That is not 
surprising, given the importance of impartiality and independence of judges as a 
prerequisite for playing their distinctive justificatory role, when they review acts of 
the legislature on the ground of highly abstract constitutional provisions. Judges 
campaigning on the grounds that they would overturn this or that unpopular 
decision or judges thinking about their chances of reelection while seeking to 
resolve a contentious case undermines the very point of constitutional review. 
On the other hand the idea that highest judges are appointed by their peers, 
without any political say, also tends to be deeply problematic. It may well be a 
good idea in most contexts to have a critical mass of members of a constitution-
al court drawn from the higher echelons of the judicial branch. And it is often a 
good idea for those appointing justices to be able to draw on assessments pro-
vided by high level judicial peers. But there are good reasons to insist on a me-
diating legitimating link between elections and judicial appointments. The idea 
that the judiciary is independent should not be misunderstood to mean that it is 
attractive that there is a separate judicial caste of persons sharing wide-ranging 
9  Judges in some states in the United States have that authority.
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sociological and ideological traits, as there may well be, if judges selected them-
selves. Political representatives should be in the driving seat, when it comes to 
the appointment of judges charged with constitutional adjudication. And those 
appointed should probably not all be drawn from the judicial branch, but reflect 
a wider range of perspectives and experiences, including the university, admin-
istration or politics. Here it is possible to discern a wide range of approaches: 
In some jurisdictions different political institutions, e.g. the President and the 
different chambers of Parliament, each get to appoint their own share of judges. 
In other jurisdictions qualified majorities are necessary to enable judicial appoint-
ments, generally fostering coalition building aimed at ensuring that only those 
candidates considered moderates stand a chance to get on the court. 
But it is not only important that there is a mediated link between elections and 
judicial appointments, that put representatives in the driving seat for determining 
who is to become a constitutional justice. It is also fundamentally important for 
how long a justice is appointed. The duration of tenure is a crucial variable for 
determining the degree of representativeness of judges. Here one can discern a 
wide range of approaches. On the one hand tenure can be for life, as it is in the 
US. Or it can be until compulsory retirement age is reached, as it is in the UK. Or 
there can be defined term limits, which typically range between 9 and 12 years. 
In most cases – and for good reasons given the importance of the independence 
and impartiality of courts – reappointment is not possible and impeachment and 
salary cuts may be applied only under very stringent rules involving members of 
the judiciary. This means that the tenure rules are effectively the decisive variable 
for determining the options that political representatives have to shape the per-
sonnel on the court to encourage it to overrule itself and more generally develop 
a jurisprudence more sensitive to democratically dominant sensibilities.
3. Rules governing the displacement of legislative decisions: 
Even if courts have the jurisdiction to declare acts of the legislature uncon-
stitutional, there are a wide range of variables that determine whether a court will 
in fact be able to pronounce itself on a legislative decision. First, there are rules 
that determine what gets before a court in the first place. Beyond rules relating 
to costs and formalities, that can erect considerable barriers of entry, there is the 
issue of standing: Who has standing to actually bring a case? Only specific ac-
tors within the institutional power structure, like specified state organs, political 
parties or parliamentary groups? Or also those who are adversely affected by a 
concrete act of enforcement authorized by legislation? Or does the jurisdiction 
recognize an actio popularis, allowing anyone to bring a challenge? Second, 
there is the issue of the range of issues over which the court has jurisdiction. Are 
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there issue areas that are off limits? Should, for example, questions of peace and 
security, or of social and economic rights or relating to the internal structure of 
political institutions be excluded from the jurisdiction of courts? Here it must suf-
fice to point out that in order for courts to be effective contestatory institutions, it 
is important that anyone who is burdenend by acts of public authorities must in 
principle be able to bring a case against public authorities to have them assess 
whether the imposition of that burden is justified. Even though different areas of 
the law might, depending on the specific forms of their institutionalization, justify 
different standards of review and larger or smaller degrees of deference to polit-
ical actors, the outright exclusion of an area from judicial review is an unjustified 
denial of contestatory possibilities for those burdened by the decisions taken. 
Furthermore the idea of an actio popularis should not be dismissed too quickly. If 
laws impose unjust burdens of others, why should only those who are burdened 
be able to bring a complaint? Why should not those in whose name that unjust 
burden is imposed on others be able to challenge such an act? We should not 
be too quick to dismiss these ideas on pragmatic grounds relating to “crowded 
dockets” or “opening the floodgates to spurious litigation”. There may well be 
other, more appropriate rules that function as filter devices for courts to maintain 
an adequate workload. 
But notwithstanding considerable variance among constitutional courts re-
lating to these kinds of issues, one of the most under-analyzed aspects of con-
siderable relevance for the relationship between courts and legislatures concerns 
judicial voting rules. Here there is a background assumption that the views of a 
majority of judges are decisive for determining whether an act is constitutional 
or not. In the US, for example, five out of nine judges are necessary to strike 
down as unconstitutional acts of public authorities. But of course this should not 
simply be taken for granted. First, there is in fact some degree of variance on 
this issue. In Germany, for example, it generally takes a 5:3 decision to declare 
unconstitutional a statute. When there is a 4:4 decision, legislation will be upheld 
as constitutional. Furthermore some decisions, such as prohibiting parties with 
a program violating basic principles of liberal constitutional democracy, require 
a qualified majority of 6:2. In South Korea, a 6:3 majority is generally required to 
strike down legislation. 
The empirical variance attracts normative interest. Is it really appropriate that 
when there is genuine disagreement among judges and there is only a bare 
majority in favor of declaring a legislative act unconstitutional, that such a bare 
majority should be able to overrule legislative majorities? Should the judgment 
that an act of legislation is a rights-infringement that can not be justified under 
the proportionality principle not be a judgment that should be endorsed by a 
qualified majority? On the one hand it may well be misguided to require judicial 
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consensus – along the lines, say, of a consensus of jury members that the ac-
cused is guilty in criminal trials in the US as a requirement for holding him guilty 
– to strike down a piece of legislation. Something close to a consensus require-
ment would make it too easy to manipulate and effectively neutralize the judiciary 
as an effective contestatory institution. All that would be necessary to effectively 
neutralize the judiciary would be to place one or two loyal party soldiers on the 
bench, who would effectively wield a veto on any decision the court makes. But 
even though consensus appears not to be the right voting rule, it is not at all 
clear why a simple majority ought to be sufficient to strike down legislation. This 
is an area where tinkering with institutional rules and imposing requirements that 
go beyond simple majorities appear to be plausible.
III. Applications: The problematic cases of the UK and the US
If we take the ideal of contestatory constitutionalism as sketched in part I, 
how should the relationship between the constitutional judiciary and the leg-
islative branches be designed? Which of the possible choices outlined above 
provides the right mix? What should the terms of engagement be? There is, of 
course, no universally applicable single blueprint to be derived from the discus-
sions above. The right mix of rules depends on a variety of factors, including 
highly contingent nationally variant questions of constitutional and political cul-
ture. But to illustrate the power of having a principled understanding of the point 
of rights adjudication as sketched in part I complemented by a set of central 
variables instrumentally relevant for the realization of that point as discussed in 
part II, the following will briefly discuss two deeply problematic cases: The case 
of the U.K. and the case of the U.S. The first, typically described in the literature 
as a paradigmatic example of “weak” judicial review is too weak. The second, 
typically described as a paradigmatic example of “strong” judicial review, is too 
strong. 
An effectively institutionalized right to Socratic contestation requires that a 
person that contests an act of public authority as a violation of his rights can 
have an impartial and independent body assess, whether that is in fact the case. 
If there is a violation of the right, an effective remedy must be provided. These 
standards are not fulfilled in the case of the UK. In the UK the Human Rights Act 
of 1998 does authorize courts to assess whether laws enacted by Parliament 
are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Courts are 
required to interpret Parliamentary laws in a way that makes them compatible 
with ECHR rights if possible. But if legislation by Westminster is not in good faith 
interpretable in such a way, because it is simply incompatible with a right, then 
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Courts still have to apply the rights-violating statute to the case before them. 
They may declare the statute to be incompatible with human rights, but the only 
consequence of such a declaration is that Parliament gets to consider whether 
or not to abolish or revise the law in a fast track procedure. If Parliament does 
nothing the law simply continues to apply. In the end courts are unable to even 
provide the minimal remedy: To declare the act illegal and not applicable to the 
person bringing the case. Here there is no qualified veto right of rights-bearers. 
And instead of courts playing a genuine editorial function, their authority is com-
parable to bodies with a consultative function, taking a position and urging the 
legislature to reconsider without the authority to decide. Note how that is different 
in another case often discussed as an instance of “weak” constitutional review: 
Canada. Here the judiciary is empowered to declare invalid laws that courts 
deem to violate constitutional rights. The legislature can in most cases re-au-
thorize the law by an ordinary majority, notwithstanding the court´s decision. Of 
course one can be skeptical of this model also: Does it not effectively make the 
same majority the judge of an issue that concerns its own claimed wrongdoing, 
violating the basic principle of nemo iudex in sua causa? Does this not effectively 
undermine the contestatory function of courts? Does that function not at require 
at least that a qualified majority is necessary to override the determination made 
by a court that a statute violates rights? This is not an easy case. But whatever 
the case might be, the UK form of “weak” judicial review raises concerns that 
disqualifies it as an appropriate institutionalization of citizens contestatory rights, 
whereas the Canadian model presents a more complex case.
On the other side the U.S. has institutionalized a system of judicial review 
that is too strong. As outlined in Part I, electorally accountable institutions must 
retain overall effective control not only over the legislative agenda, but also over 
outcomes. This is necessary to ensure a sufficiently close link between elections 
and the authorial function of legislation. These standards are arguably not met 
in the U.S. The problem there is that three institutional features work together to 
ensure that decisions by the Supreme Court are extremely hard to overturn and 
judges have an inappropriately central role to play in the overall constitutional 
process. On the one hand, there are the rules relating to constitutional amend-
ments. In the US Art. V U.S.C. requires not only that a qualified majority in both 
houses to pass an amendment, but also the ratification of ¾ of the 50 states. 
This makes passing constitutional amendments an extremely burdensome pro-
cess and a rare historical event. The burdensome nature of the amendment 
process is then complemented by life tenure of Supreme Court judges in the 
U.S., compared to a term of 9-12 years in most jurisdictions. There is no time 
limit in terms of years, there is no compulsory retirement and some judges, like 
most popes, stay in office long into their seventies or even eighties, until they 
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die. The last nine Supreme Court Justices that have either died or retired – the 
predecessors of current Supreme Court Justices – have remained in office for 26 
years on average. The power of Supreme Court Justices is further enhanced by 
the fact that an ordinary majority of five out of nine judges can overturn a legisla-
tive act and many highly controversial decisions are 5:4. A simple majority rule, 
although very widespread among constitutional courts, works together with the 
other institutional features to establish the Supreme Court as an institution with 
power arguably unbefitting for a judicial institution. 
The interplay of these institutional rules is to a large extent why the ap-
pointment of judges is widely considered one of the most important things a 
President does, and why coverage of Supreme Court decision-making and the 
analysis of judicial opinions reaches staggering proportions. If the debates relat-
ing to the legitimacy of judicial review have been so central to US constitutional 
culture that might not only be because of the comparatively strong democratic 
commitments American share when compared to some of their European coun-
terparts, whose thinking is informed by national legacies of popularly supported 
fascist and communist governments. It might also have something to do with 
the distinctively juristocratic institutionalization of judicial power in the U.S. Com-
pare this with the institutionalization of judicial power, say, in Germany, also a 
country known for its influential constitutional court: The German constitution 
can be amended by a simple two thirds majority in the Bundestag and Bun-
desrat. Since its entry into force in 1949 the constitution has been amended 60 
times, a little less than once a year on average – at a rate more than 10 times as 
frequent as the US constitution. Judges are appointed for 12 years, not for life, 
and decisions generally require a 5:3 majority and in some cases a 6:2 majority10. 
Not surprisingly, whereas first year students are highly likely to be able to recite 
the names of all nine Supreme Court Justices in the US, in Germany even a 
Professor of public law would typically struggle to name considerably more than 
half of the sixteen judges on the Constitutional Court. 
Clearly the different perception of judicial power and the role of individual 
judges can not be reduced to the variables that have been the focus here. Oth-
er factors such as the way law is taught, the way opinions are written, the role 
of concurring and dissenting opinions also help account for these differences. 
Furthermore there is a problem of judicial power in Germany, too: The constitu-
tional court can declare invalid even constitutional amendments, when it deems 
them to violate certain basic principles deemed unamendable. Even though this 
feature of the German constitution has not played a central role historically, it 
10  See Art. 15(4) Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz.
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may do so in the future. A question that can´t be pursued here is under which 
circumstances, if any, such an empowerment of courts is defensible. 
What these discussions have hopefully provided some evidence for, is that 
the conventional distinction between “weak” and “strong” forms of judicial re-
view is not helpful. The unsatisfying nature of the debate that discusses the 
legitimacy of judicial review by contrasting, for example, the UK with the U.S. as 
competing paradigms may have at least in part something to do with the fact 
that both of them are deeply problematic. Imagine the US constitution could be 
amended by qualified majority in both houses of Congress. Or even, if we take 
current amendment rules as given and practically unalterable: What if judges had 
to commit themselves to serve only for a 12 year term, thus allowing each Pres-
ident to appoint three judges over four years? And what if additionally the Court 
could declare unconstitutional legislative acts only with a 6:3 majority? Would 
there still be the same kind of debate on the democratic legitimacy of judicial re-
view? Maybe not, but that, of course, is a counterfactual empirical question. The 
real point here is a normative one: the introduction of such reforms would clear-
ly be a step towards appropriately institutionalizing contestatory rights against 
legislative majorities, while avoiding the pitfalls of juristocracy. Once the debate 
on judicial review is informed by a better understanding of the moral point of 
judicial review and the wider range of variables that need to be considered for 
its appropriate institutionalization, the focus changes and the range of concerns 
and institutional options to address them becomes clearer. What also becomes 
clearer is the outlier status of both the UK and the US, with the great majority of 
liberal constitutional democracies ranging from Canada, Columbia, South Africa, 
Spain or South Korea having chosen paths that appear to avoid both the pitfalls 
of electoral authoritarianism and juristocracy.
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